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Abstract 
Do crackdowns on bribery impact corrupt behavior in the long run? In this paper we observe the 
long-run impact of a short-term punishment institution (i.e., a crackdown) on bribery behavior in 
a lab setting. We conduct lab experiments in two countries with cultures that differ in corruption 
norms, and which experience very different levels of bribery:  the US and Pakistan.  Bribery is 
implemented in the laboratory as a repeated three-player sequential game, consisting of a firm, a 
government official and a citizen. The design contains three phases:  pre-crackdown, crackdown, 
and post-crackdown.  Results show that post-crackdown behavior is not significantly different 
from the pre-crackdown behavior in either country.  We conclude that short-term crackdowns 
may impact behavior in the short run, depending on the strength of the existing corruption norms 
in the country.  More importantly, in our setting crackdowns are completely ineffective in the 
long run, as corrupt behavior rebounds to pre-crackdown levels.  
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1 Introduction 
Because corruption is seen as an important impediment to growth, governments 
implement a variety of policies to combat its effects.  These include citizen advocacy, public 
expenditure tracking surveys, independent watchdog agencies, and large-scale corruption 
crackdowns. Anti-corruption reforms are costly, in that they require substantial expenditures in 
terms of manpower and time, as well as large amounts of political capital, to sustain the 
intervention.  Most reforms begin with a period of high intensity and scrutiny, but because this 
level of activity is not sustainable, it is followed by either a partial or complete retraction. These 
temporary “crackdowns” occur very frequently in countries where corruption is an important 
issue, suggesting that punctuated corruption crackdowns may be viewed as effective in changing 
expectations or norms of behavior.1   However, they may have little long run impact, with 
corrupt behavior rebounding when the crackdown phase is over.  It even is possible that 
crackdowns exacerbate the corruption problem by crowding out existing intrinsic motives 
against corruption.2 
In this paper, we use lab experiments to investigate whether corruption crackdowns 
inhibit or exacerbate corruption in the long run. We observe the long-run impact of a short-run 
punishment institution (i.e., a crackdown) on one particular type of corrupt transaction: bribery.3  
Crackdowns in developing countries usually emerge in conjunction with elections, or with actual 
or anticipated changes in political conditions in response to scandals, discontent among the 
populace, or attempts to de-legitimize regimes (Brinkerhoff and Kulibaba 1996; Kpundeh, 1999). 
These crackdowns contain differing combinations of rhetoric and substance, but share a common 
feature that reforms typically break down after an initial period of high impact. For example, 
Dininio (2005) presents the case of La Paz, Bolivia, where anti-corruption reforms were 
introduced, championed by the mayor.  Once the mayor left office, however, corrupt practices 
returned in force. Similarly, Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003) present the case of Buenos Aires, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For example, Lui (1983) reports 304 cases in China over a period of just four years resulting from multiple 
crackdowns on corrupt practices as reported in the media.  Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003) provide an example in 
Argentina, and Dininio (2005) provides examples in Bolivia, Venezuela, and Italy.  In recent times China has 
signaled intent to crack down by prosecuting a high profile politician (Bo Xilai) due to corruption (Buckley, 2013). 
2 A number of studies show that fines can crowd out intrinsic motives for refraining from “bad” behavior, with 
short- and long-run consequences (e.g., Gneezy and Rustichini 2000). See fn. 6.   
3 Corruption is defined as the “use of public office for private gain” (Jain 2001). Bribery constitutes one aspect of 
corruption, and requires a payment by an interested party to a government official in exchange for benefits at a cost 
to a third party. Bribery, in and of itself, may be welfare-neutral, welfare-enhancing, or welfare-reducing, depending 
on the cost it imposes on parties external to the transaction (Cameron et al. 2009). 
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where a crackdown on corruption decreased corrupt behavior, only for it to rebound once the 
intensity of monitoring was lowered.     
 Aside from Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003), however, little is known about the effects 
of these crackdowns on overall corruption levels due to the absence of data that can be used to 
evaluate such interventions.  Some evidence suggests that if reforms are not sustained, re-
corruption (or backsliding) occurs (e.g. Dininio, 2005).  From the perspective of standard 
economic theory, the decision to engage in corrupt behavior is made based on the (extrinsic) 
costs and rewards of doing so, leading to the expectation that post-crackdown behavior will 
return to pre-crackdown levels (Becker 1968).  
Intrinsic motives may play a role in the decision to refrain from corrupt behavior in that 
an individual incurs “moral costs” by engaging in corruption (Abbink, 2005, among others). 
Recent research on corruption emphasizes non-pecuniary motives in corrupt transactions, and 
highlight differences in levels of corruption and response to policy changes across cultures 
(Banuri and Eckel 2012; Abbink and Serra 2012). For example, Fisman and Miguel (2007) show 
that the number of diplomats with unpaid parking tickets in New York correlates strongly with 
the corruption level of their country of origin. Cameron et al. (2009) demonstrate that the 
propensity both to practice and to punish corruption differs by culture, and that the variation in 
corruption by gender also depends on culture. Barr and Serra (2010) find that individuals 
originating from corrupt countries are more likely to engage in corrupt acts in a lab setting.4   
The implication of this line of research is that intrinsic motives and norms are important, 
and policies should be designed accordingly (Bardhan 2006).5 If intrinsic motives play a role in 
abstaining from corruption, then even a short-term policy has the potential to impact long-run 
behavior in a positive way. Crackdowns may reduce corruption in the long run, if the crackdown 
signals a new norm, which is then internalized by the corrupt agents. However, it is also possible 
that a crackdown may exacerbate the corruption problem by crowding out “good” motivations.6 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For theoretical research in this area, see Hauk and Saez-Marti (2002). For empirical work, see Licht et al. (2007). 
5 Intrinsic motives and norms are related concepts.  A norm of corruption constitutes an expectation of corrupt 
behavior within the society. Intrinsic motivations depend on social norms: the propensity to engage in corruption is 
dependent upon the behavior of peers and collective reputations (Tirole 1996). As Bicchieri and Muldoon (2011) 
point out, policy interventions can serve to change potentially harmful norms that are prevalent in a society. 
6 Motivation crowding theory (Frey and Jegen 2001) provides conditions under which crowding-out occurs. 
Interventions designed to limit behavior crowd out intrinsic motivation, while interventions designed to support 
behavior crowd in intrinsic motivation. This crowding out may have long term effects, making institutions that 
impact intrinsic motives particularly worthy as an area of inquiry.  An example of the perverse effect of incentives is 
Gneezy and Rustichini (2000), who test the short- and long-run impact of implementing a fine on parents who arrive 
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In either case, differences in norms may impact the post-crackdown effect of a policy.  In 
countries with high levels of corruption and robust norms supporting corruption, the long run 
impact of a short-run intervention is likely to be small.    
The central question addressed in this study is whether a crackdown has long-term 
effects.  In a companion study we demonstrate the effectiveness of a punishment regime in 
combating bribery (Banuri and Eckel 2014).  This paper focuses instead on the post-crackdown 
period:  Once a crackdown regime is removed, does it have a lasting impact on behavior? 
Furthermore, do the effects vary by culture: that is, does the crackdown have different post-
crackdown effects in societies with weak corruption norms versus societies with strong 
corruption norms?  
Laboratory experiments are particularly useful for assessing policy changes where field 
data are limited. This paper tests directly the long-term impact of a short-term punishment 
regime in the lab. By using the lab, we implement a “clean test” of a policy change, removing all 
other confounding factors that affect outcomes in the field. The use of the lab to study corruption 
has its share of critics, however.  In particular, there is considerable debate about using 
laboratory methods to study complex social phenomena such as corruption and social norms. 
Laboratory experiments often implement simplified versions of a phenomenon.  Detractors argue 
that such simplification is inappropriate, as it removes necessary contextual richness. 
Furthermore, inferring long-term impacts in a lab context may also be inappropriate, as remarked 
by Gneezy and List (2006).  Perhaps the strongest critique of lab studies in this arena is its weak 
external validity, particularly when using developed-country subjects. We attempt to account for 
this potential shortcoming by using subjects from two countries. 
 The US and Pakistan are selected as venues for the study due to their differences in 
overall perceptions of corruption and experience with bribery.7  US subjects constitute a sample 
from a society with weak norms of corruption: here petty corruption is relatively rare, and 
tolerance for it is low.  In contrast, Pakistani subjects constitute a sample from a society with 
strong norms of corruption: here corruption (petty corruption in particular, but grand corruption 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
late to collect their children from a day-care center. They find that the fine increases the number of parents who 
arrive late, and its subsequent removal fails to restore the previous pattern of behavior. Implementation of the fine 
crowds out intrinsic motivation, and this effect persists after the fine is removed. See Gneezy et al. (2011) for an 
excellent review of when and how incentives work to modify behavior. Ryan and Deci (2000) discuss the same 
issues from a psychological perspective; see Deci at al. (1999) for a meta-analysis of 128 such studies.  
7 See Banuri and Eckel (2014) for a more extensive discussion of sample differences in student populations in these 
two countries in experience with corruption.  
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as well) is frequent and expected (Fisman and Miguel 2007; Kaufmann et al. 2005; Treisman 
2007; Transparency International 2011). The experiment uses a repeated game with stable 
partners, consisting of three players: a firm, which can initiate a bribe; a government official, 
which can provide a favor to the firm; and a citizen, representing a third party that is impacted by 
the actions of the government official. We use a within-subjects ABA design, with the first 10 
rounds of the experiment having no possibility of punishment (called the “pre-crackdown 
phase”). The second 10 rounds introduce the possibility of punishment (“crackdown phase”); 
here the citizen can choose to punish either the firm or the government official, or both, at a cost 
to themselves. The final 10 rounds are identical to the first; i.e., the punishment institution is 
removed and behavior is then observed (“post-crackdown phase”). Our focus is to compare 
bribery in the first 10 rounds with the final 10 rounds in order to test for differences after the 
crackdown has ended.   
 Our findings show that crackdowns have some impact on bribery behavior in the short 
term, particularly in low corruption settings (while enforcement is active), but behavior returns to 
pre-crackdown levels during the post-crackdown phase. These results favor the economists’ view 
that corruption is determined by extrinsic factors. Short run institutions are largely ineffective in 
altering behavior in the long run in both high and low corruption settings. Sustained legal 
enforcement may be necessary to constrain corruption, even in societies with weak norms. 
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section contains a brief review of 
recent literature on experiments in corruption, culture, and social norms. In subsequent sections 
we describe the experimental design, implementation, and results. The final section concludes.   
 
2 Related Literature 
Economists have sought a deeper understanding of the role of norms and culture in 
corrupt activity, and several such studies illustrate the value of the lab as a venue for studying 
corruption. Abbink et al. (2002) conduct some of the first lab experiments exploring the role of 
extrinsic motives on corruption.  Using a repeated two-player game consisting of a firm and a 
government official, they show that exogenously-imposed punishment (with a very low 
probability) significantly reduces subjects’ propensity to engage in corrupt acts. However, if 
corruption generates negative externalities for other participants, this does little to discourage 
bribery. Abbink (2004) further shows that staff rotation is a successful policy intervention that 
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reduces the overall level of bribery. Finally, Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2006) compare the 
use of loaded language (i.e. the use of the term ‘bribe’) in instructions and find no discernible 
difference from a more neutral framing. Our design is informed by this research.8 
 In a field setting that parallels the experimental design presented here, Di Tella and 
Schargrodsky (2003) observe medical supply purchasing behavior of hospital employees before 
and after a corruption crackdown in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Using price data on medical 
inputs, they argue that higher reported prices constitute embezzlement by employees, and are 
able to show that an increase in monitoring has an immediate impact on prices, though the 
impact diminishes over time as monitoring decreases. However, prices do not return to pre-
crackdown levels. They show that the long run impact on prices is due to continued monitoring 
in the post-crackdown phase, as well as higher compensation for employees (respondents that are 
paid higher wages are less likely to purchase inputs at inappropriately high prices), rather than a 
change in norms of behavior. This result illustrates the importance of extrinsic incentives: 
embezzlement responds to monitoring.  However, higher salaries also play an important role, and 
in combination with the greater threat of punishment, yield a discernible change in behavior. One 
issue with Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003) is that they use the crackdown as a backdrop to 
examine the role of wages in constraining corruption.  However, the independent effect of the 
crackdown – in terms of raising awareness, removing worst offenders, changing motives and 
norms – cannot be identified. We add to the literature on the effect of anti-corruption policies by 
isolating the effect of crackdowns on long-run, post-crackdown behavior. 
 Experiments also examine the impact of intrinsic motives and cultural norms on 
behavior. Cameron et al. (2009) conduct a cross-cultural experiment on bribery using subjects 
from four countries (Australia, India, Indonesia, and Singapore) in a one-shot three-player 
bribery game. Their treatments vary the level of punishment and welfare effects of bribes. They 
find similar propensities to engage in corruption across cultures, but different usage of 
punishment. Subjects in India are more tolerant of bribes than in Australia (consistent with 
corruption norms); however, subjects in Singapore are more tolerant than subjects in Indonesia 
(inconsistent with corruption norms). They argue that this inconsistency arises from recent 
institutional changes in Indonesia designed to combat corruption. Using a similar framework, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  The discussion below does not exhaust the experimental literature on corruption.  For related results on bribery see 
also Van Veldhuizen 2013, Armantier and Boly 2012, Abbink 2005; and for related results on embezzlement, Azfar 
and Nelson 2007, Barr et al. 2009.  We focus here on the work most relevant to the current study.  	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Alatas et al. (2009) show that gender differences in corruption vary by culture. In a related 
experimental paper, we show that implementation of punishment varies by culture: Pakistani 
subjects punish corrupt behavior less than Americans, and thus identical institutions designed to 
curb corrupt behavior produce different effects across cultures (Banuri and Eckel 2014).  
 Barr and Serra (2010) conduct an experiment using international students at Oxford 
University. They find that individuals from more corrupt societies are more likely to engage in 
corruption in the lab. They argue that subjects bring their social norms into the lab, and these 
norms impact their intrinsic motivation to engage in corrupt activities. These results are similar 
to Fisman and Miguel (2007), who show greater parking violations by diplomats from high-
corruption countries. In related research, Bicchieri (2006) provides an excellent overview and 
argues that preferences for norm compliance rely on expectations about norms in the population 
(empirical expectations), and expectations that others will adhere to the norm (normative 
expectations). A norm can then be internalized (i.e. transformed into intrinsic motivation) when 
one attributes value in conforming to the norm absent of external inputs.  
Another important area of inquiry involves the use of punishment to reduce free riding in 
public goods settings. Fehr and Gachter (2000) show that allowing subjects to punish non-
contributors substantially reduces free riding and increases voluntary contributions to public 
goods. Herrmann et al. (2008) examine punishment behavior across cultures.  Chaudhuri (2011) 
provides a review of laboratory research on punishment. It is worth noting that several studies 
adopt a similar design to ours, consisting of pre-punishment, punishment and post-punishment 
phases.  Our design is most similar to Masclet et al. (2003), which examines the role of monetary 
vs. non-monetary punishment mechanisms in public goods games.  Their main finding is that 
non-monetary punishment is as effective in raising contributions as monetary punishment. Most 
relevant for us, however, is that they find no differences in contributions in the post-punishment 
phase in either case, indicating the importance sustaining an intervention to enhance 
contributions.  We find results in line with theirs. 
 
3. Experimental Design and Implementation 
To test the effects of a crackdown, we construct a three-player repeated bribery game 
with fixed partners. The three players are: a firm that makes a discrete choice of whether to offer 
a bribe to the government official; a government official that observes the firm’s behavior and 
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makes a discrete choice whether to grant the firm a favor; and a third party (citizen) who is 
negatively impacted by the transaction. In the baseline the citizen is passive, but in the 
punishment phase he can punish, at a cost, both the official and the firm.  Figure 1 presents the 
structure of the game.  
[Figure 1 here] 
 Note that all players begin with an initial endowment of 50 tokens; thus the initial 
distribution of resources is “fair.”  Furthermore, since engaging in corruption reduces total 
welfare, this starting point is also the social optimum.  To offer a bribe, the firm incurs a cost of 
10 tokens; this cost is incurred regardless of whether the bribe is accepted. The official can 
observe the offer, and can then choose to accept the bribe and provide a favor to the firm, or to 
reject and report the bribe.  Providing a favor costs the government official 2 tokens (understood 
as the costs of dishonesty, similar to Abbink et al. 2002).  The favor benefits the firm by 30 
tokens, and hurts the citizen by 35 tokens, yielding a reduction in net welfare.  Finally, the 
government official can provide a favor, even if a bribe has not been offered; doing so solicits a 
bribe by signaling to the firm his willingness to engage in bribery.  This is an important aspect of 
the repeated game framework; officials can effectively initiate the bribery process even if the 
firm does not do so.9  Further note that in the baseline (without punishment) the citizen is 
passive, and does not have any action that impacts the earnings of the other two players.10 The 
Nash equilibrium of the stage game is for the firm to bribe, and the official to accept the bribe 
and grant a favor.    
In the second phase a crackdown is implemented via a punishment institution whereby 
citizens can allocate up to 15 tokens to punish either the firm, or the government official, or both.  
The punishment technology is linear, and an expenditure of one token by the citizen reduces the 
earnings of the target by two tokens. Note that because punishment is costly, the Nash 
equilibrium of the stage game remains unchanged, where a bribe is offered and a favor provided, 
and punishment is zero.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 This design choice stems directly from the observation that petty corruption involves fixed relationships.  Officials 
know that there is a distribution of clean and corrupt agents, and often have to signal their willingness to participate 
in bribe transactions before bribes are offered.  Officials can signal their willingness by providing favors in the 
hopes of attracting bribes at a later date. 
10 For the sake of parallelism, we asked citizens to indicate a hypothetical punishment decision, so that they were 
also forced to pay attention and less likely to become bored. 
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This form of “third-party punishment” is designed to capture whistle-blowing, the first 
step towards prosecuting corruption.  It is common in developing countries that a citizen, at some 
cost, can take the first move in initiating a prosecution that can result in fines or imprisonment 
for the parties to the corrupt transaction.11 The cost of punishment reflects the short-term burden 
of the whistle-blower.  Reporting the transaction may yield benefits, but likely only in the long 
run. In most countries, there is no immediate benefit to reporting a bribe, which is why amnesty 
programs for those who report paying a bribe have been proposed (Basu, 2011).12 
Furthermore, our design allows citizens to punish firms and officials regardless of their 
actual behavior. This design choice was made in part for simplicity, to avoid imposing rules on 
citizens about when they can punish. In addition, the fixed-partners design, which reflects the 
repeated interaction inherent in most petty corruption, means that punishment can be effective 
whenever it is implemented.  This mimics a situation where citizens can report and punish 
wrongdoing in a repeated interaction at any point. Finally, since subjects are in fixed triads and 
develop reputations, punishment has strategic value, even though it does not change the Nash 
equilibrium in monetary payoffs.13 
At the beginning of the experiment subjects are told that they will engage in three tasks, 
and that all earnings accumulated throughout the session will be paid to them in cash at the end 
of the session.  First is the pre-crackdown phase, which consists of ten rounds where the citizen’s 
role is passive: his payoffs are determined by the actions of the other two payers. Second is the 
crackdown phase, consisting of ten rounds where the citizen is given the option to punish the 
other two players.  While subjects know that the experiment will continue for multiple rounds, 
the instructions for the second phase are revealed only at the end of the first phase (and 
instructions for the third phase revealed only at the end of the second phase). The third, post-
crackdown phase consists of ten rounds, and is identical to the first phase. A quiz is conducted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 An alternative way to model punishment is via institutional punishment (as in Abbink et al., 2002), where 
detection is probabilistic, and the penalty is implemented automatically (by the experimenter) conditional on 
detection. See Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) for an experimental study of third-party punishment across cultures.    
12 The current use of internet technology (for example, corruption reporting websites such as “ipaidabribe.com”) is 
designed to reduce the costs of reporting for the citizens.   
13 In our model (as in the real world), bribery is risky. To overcome this, officials sometimes have relationships with 
specialists whose sole job is to mediate bribery transactions with citizens. An example of this is discussed in 
Bertrand et al. (2007), where agents exist that conduct corrupt transactions with officials in driver’s license offices in 
India.  Having fixed partners allows subjects to accurately calibrate the risks associated with bribery.  
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after each set of instructions to gauge comprehension of the task.  Since partners are fixed 
throughout the session, subjects are reminded of this at the beginning of each phase.  
Note that we use ‘loaded’ language – describing the players as firm, official and citizen – 
to increase the probability of triggering social norms; however we do not use words with an 
illegal connotation (such as “bribe”).  Loaded language enhances subject understanding of the 
environment of the experiment, but avoiding stronger terms protects against negative framing 
that might yield experimenter demand effects. 
Sessions were conducted in February and March 2010. Samples are drawn from each of 
two countries that vary in the overall level of corruption: In the US, 96 undergraduate students 
were recruited at the University of Texas at Dallas; in Pakistan, 123 undergraduate students were 
recruited at the Institute of Business Administration in Karachi. Table 1 describes the samples in 
the two locations.  Game instructions are provided in the online appendix. All sessions were 
conducted in English.14 In each session, subjects were randomly assigned to the role of firm, 
government official, or citizen. The roles for each subject remained fixed throughout the session.  
[Table 1 here] 
In the final stage of each session, subjects were asked to complete a survey containing 
questions about their demographic and socioeconomic status, as well as questions relating to the 
experiments themselves. At the end of the session, subjects were paid their cumulative earnings, 
including a show up fee of $5 in the US and PKR 100 in Pakistan. The exchange rate for tokens 
was $1 USD for 100 tokens in the US and PKR 30 for every 100 tokens in Pakistan, such that for 
the most conservative response (no bribe, no favor and no punishment), each subject would earn 
$10 USD.  Payoffs were calibrated across the two countries based on the cost of two lunches at 
local restaurants that students at each location were known to frequent.  The instructions and 
game were computerized using the z-Tree application developed by Fischbacher (2007).  
 
4. Results  
Table 2 provides a summary of the overall bribes and favors in the experiment.  In the 
pre-crackdown phase (rounds 1 - 10), bribes are offered in the US in 72 percent of decisions, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 At the Institute of Business Administration in Pakistan, all instruction is in English.  Indeed, all schooling of these 
subjects would have been in English-based schools.  Most students at the university sit for standardized British high 
school examinations (O and A levels). English is the language of choice for business transactions at this level.  
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in 66 percent of decisions in Pakistan (the difference is not significant: p=0.60).15 During the 
crackdown, US bribes are significantly lower, dropping to approximately 33 percent, while in 
Pakistan they are relatively stable at 54 percent (difference between US and Pakistan in 
crackdown phase: p<0.10). This reduction (from pre-crackdown to crackdown phase) is 
significantly lower in the US (p<0.01), but not in Pakistan (p=0.12).  Finally, in the post-
crackdown phase, US bribes rebound back to 63 percent (a 9 percent reduction from pre-
crackdown: p=0.27), while Pakistan bribes rebound back to 60 percent (a 12 percent reduction 
from pre-crackdown: p=0.44).  Post-crackdown bribes are not significantly different between the 
US and Pakistan (p=0.84).   
Favors are granted in the US at a rate of 54 percent during the pre-crackdown rounds, not 
significantly different from 56 percent in Pakistan (p=0.87). During the crackdown phase, a 
substantial reduction in favors is observed in the US (from 54 to 16 percent, p<0.001). In 
Pakistan, however, a relatively small reduction is observed during the crackdown (from 56 to 44 
percent, p=0.12). In this phase, favors are significantly lower in the US than in Pakistan 
(p<0.05).  Post crackdown, however, favors rebound for the US sample back up to 52 percent 
(p=0.82). For the Pakistan sample, favors rebound to 47 percent (p=0.23).  In addition, favors in 
the post crackdown phase are not significantly different across cultures (p=0.67).  
[Table 2 here] 
Figure 2 illustrates the overall levels of bribes and favors across the two cultures. This 
figure tells the main story of the results.  Pre-crackdown behavior is quite similar across the two 
countries, in contrast to previous studies (Cameron et al. 2009; Barr and Serra, 2010).16 During 
the crackdown phase, both bribes and favors fall in both countries, but the US levels are below 
those of Pakistan.  Most importantly, regardless of what happens during the crackdown, bribery 
rebounds sharply at the end of the crackdown phase.  These results point to the ineffectiveness of 
crackdowns in constraining corrupt behavior in the long run.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Unless otherwise indicated, all non-parametric tests between the US and Pakistan are 2 sample, 2-tailed 
proportions tests.  Non-parametric tests between phases are one-sample 2-tailed proportions tests.  Since this is a 
repeated game, treating each decision as independent is inappropriate.  Therefore, the proportions tests are 
conducted using each subject as a single observation, rather than each decision as a single observation. 
16 In the pre- and post-crackdown periods, bribery is virtually identical across the two cultures, despite major 
differences in corruption. There are a number of reasons why this could arise, but differences in design are likely to 
play a role. The experiments in Cameron et al. 2009 and Barr and Serra 2010 are one-shot, while ours are repeated 
(following Abbink et al. 2002).  The repetition removes uncertainty associated with bribery, and population-based 
beliefs about others’ behavior play a limited role. Further study is needed to disentangle possible causes.   
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[Figure 2 here] 
   
4.1 Pre- and Post-Crackdown Comparison of Bribes and Favors 
Next, we turn to the main question of our study: comparing behavior in the pre-
crackdown and post crackdown phases with each other.  We observed that the beginning of the 
post-crackdown phase shows a large break with the overall trend in the experiment.  We turn our 
attention to whether corruption increases or decreases once punishment institutions are removed 
(in the post-crackdown era).   
Figure 3 presents bribe frequencies and compares behavior in the post-crackdown phase 
with behavior in the pre-crackdown phase for the US (top left) and Pakistan (top right).  Figure 3 
also presents favor frequencies in the pre- and post-crackdown phases for the US (bottom left) 
and Pakistan (bottom right).  What is striking in these figures is that the overall trend in bribes 
and favors is virtually identical between the phases.  
[Figure 3 here] 
To formally test differences between pre- and post-crackdown bribes and favors, we 
estimate random-effects probit models on the probability of offering a bribe in the US and 
Pakistan separately.17  We regress the dummy variable for offering a bribe (equaling 1 if a bribe 
was offered) on dummy variables for the crackdown and post-crackdown phases. We use the 
round number (from 1 to 10) to account for the trend in each phase separately.18 We also control 
for basic demographic information (gender and age).  Estimation results are shown in table 3: 
model 1 reports the results for the US, while model 2 does the same for Pakistan.19	  	  If bribery 
responds purely to incentives, then we should observe no difference in the post-crackdown phase 
relative to the pre-crackdown phase.  However, if intrinsic motives to abstain from corruption are 
important, then the post-crackdown phase could be affected by the crackdown.  If such motives 
are crowded out, then we should observe an increase in bribery in the post-crackdown phase; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Estimates are robust to using fixed effects logit models (not shown).   
18 We use the round numbers for each phase separately so as to compare the intercepts and slopes from the post-
crackdown phase to the intercept and slope in the pre-crackdown phase directly.  The online appendix presents the 
alternate specification under the assumption of a common trend with structural breaks.  We are grateful to an 
anonymous referee for pointing out this alternate specification. 
19 Results are robust to controlling for history within the triad (i.e. a variable indicating whether a favor was granted 
in the previous round).  This is excluded from the table due to endogeneity concerns.  Adding additional lags 
(beyond a single period) also does not alter our results. 
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alternatively, if punishment signals a new norm, then we should observe a reduction in bribes in 
the post-crackdown phase.  
[Table 3 here] 
The regression results confirm what we observe in the figures.  In the post-crackdown 
phase, bribe behavior is not significantly different from the pre-crackdown phase, either in the 
US (p=0.34), or in Pakistan (p=0.81).  During the Crackdown phase, however, bribes are 
significantly lower than in the pre-crackdown phase by about 44% overall (p<0.01).  This is not 
true for Pakistan, however, where we observe an overall decline of just 6% (p=0.50).  In the US, 
the probability of offering a bribe declines over time at a rate of 3.8% per round (p<0.01),20 and 
is not significantly different in either the crackdown or post-crackdown phases (p=0.23 and 
p=0.74 respectively).21  In Pakistan, the probability of offering a bribe declines at a rate of 0.88% 
per round, but it is not significantly different from zero (p=0.39).  Further, the probability is not 
significantly different in the crackdown and post-crackdown phases (p=0.14 and p=0.20 
respectively).   
Favors also display a virtually identical pattern to bribes.  Table 3 reports favor results for 
the US and Pakistan, using the same model specification as above, focusing on government 
official behavior.  Again, both in the US (p=0.31) and Pakistan (p=0.26), post-crackdown 
probability of providing a favor is not significantly different from the pre-crackdown probability 
overall.  We observe a significant reduction in the probability in the crackdown phase for the US 
(a reduction of 45%; p<0.01), but not for Pakistan (p=0.32).  In the US, favor probability 
declines over time at the rate of 4.1% per round (p<0.01), and does not significantly differ for the 
crackdown and post-crackdown rounds (p=0.73 and p=0.50 respectively).  In Pakistan, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Changes in probability were calculated using marginal effects (not reported).	  
21	  What would explain the reduction in the probability of offering a bribe or favor over time in the US? This is a 
surprising result that has not been found in previous research. Abbink and coauthors (2002, 2004, 2006) have 
conducted repeated versions of bribery games, with no decline.  However, a key difference between our design and 
theirs lies in the target of the externality.  Under their framework, the negative externality of corruption is imposed 
on all other players of the game, and indeed, each firm/official dyad is subject to externalities generated from other 
players of the game.  Our design implements a single target of the negative externality, which increases the salience 
of the externality for the subjects.  Moral costs rise with cumulative externalities, and with higher moral costs, 
subjects find it more costly and difficult to engage in corruption.  In Table A1 in the online appendix, we provide 
some evidence for this, as each successful bribe reduces the likelihood of a favor by 7% in the first ten rounds 
(p<0.05).  We can speculate that the moral costs are more salient for the government officials (since they have the 
choice directly impacting the externality), and hence why the effect is observed for the favors, and not for bribes.  
This is suggestive evidence, as our data does not allow us to completely explore the nature of the decline.  In 
addition, it is also not clear why culture would have a differential impact on the salience (we do not observe this 
downward decline in Pakistan).  In the appendix we then argue that this decline may be something of an illusion, as 
it is not observed in a similar experiment without a “crackdown” regime change in period 11.  	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probability of providing a favor is also declining, but it is not significant overall (p=0.59), or in 
the crackdown and post-crackdown phases (p=0.25 and p=0.64 respectively).  
One aspect of this analysis is to test the effectiveness of crackdowns across the two 
settings.  In order to do this, we pool the US and Pakistan samples and estimate random-effects 
probit models on the probability of offering a bribe (model 1) and the probability of providing a 
favor (model 2), for just the pre- and post-crackdown phases. 22  We add Pakistan interaction 
terms for the intercepts and slopes of the pre- and post-crackdown phases.  Thus, as before, we 
directly compare behavior in the pre- and post-crackdown phases, but across cultures.  We 
regress the dummy variable for offering a bribe (equaling 1 if a bribe was offered) on a dummy 
variable for the post-crackdown phase. We use the round number (from 1 to 10) to account for 
the trend in each phase separately, and interact a dummy variable for Pakistan with each of the 
variables above.  We also control for basic demographic information (gender and age).  The 
results are presented in table 4.  Crucially, we see that the pre-post crackdown differences in 
intercepts and slopes are not significantly different between the two countries (intercept 
difference-in-difference: p=0.33; slope difference-in-difference: p=0.85).   
These results confirm the incentives hypothesis, that crackdowns are ineffective in 
sustaining reductions in bribery regardless of intrinsic motives or norms.  There are a few 
interesting differences, however.  First, the initial probability of offering a bribe is significantly 
higher in the US than in Pakistan (p<0.10). However, while the probability of a bribe 
significantly decreases over time in the US, it significantly increases in Pakistan, relative to the 
US (p<0.05), and is relatively stable overall (i.e. not significantly different from zero: p=0.40).  
This higher initial probability of bribe offers is puzzling since overall levels of corruption in 
Pakistan are greater than in the US.  Our data do not allow us to address this question. 
[Table 4 here] 
Overall, the results show an interesting pattern.  First, in the US, the crackdown appears 
to have an immediate effect on bribes and favors.  In addition to this, we observe sharp rebounds 
in bribe and favor behavior once the crackdown is removed.  In Pakistan neither the trend, nor 
the crackdown, point to a reduction in bribes or favors.  These results indicate that once the 
crackdown is alleviated, subjects return to the pre-crackdown levels of bribes and favors.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Since we are primarily interested in a direct comparison of the pre- and post-crackdown phases, the regression 
drops the crackdown phase. 
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4.2 Crackdown Impact: Punishment, Bribes and Favors 
 Despite the fact that punishment is costly to the punisher, we see a considerable amount 
of punishment in the experiment in both countries.  Punishment behavior during the crackdown 
phase across the two countries is described in figure 4, which shows average differences in 
punishment between countries for four possible combinations of bribes and favors.  The figure 
contains the difference in punishment expenditure between US and Pakistani subjects, and shows 
that while punishment of firms is not significantly different between the two countries, subjects 
in Pakistan punish government officials at significantly lower levels when favors have 
occurred.23 Punishment of government officials is lower in Pakistan when a favor has been 
granted, indicating that officials are less likely to be held responsible for their corrupt behavior.     
[Figure 4 here] 
In addition, figure 5 presents expenditure on firm and official punishment separately for 
the US and Pakistan and shows that punishment declines over time during the crackdown phase 
as firms and officials reduce their corrupt practices.     
[Figure 5 here] 
During the crackdown phase, punishment directly and indirectly affects corrupt behavior, 
and contributes to the impact of the crackdown.24  To test the effectiveness of both direct and 
indirect punishment, we conduct random effects OLS regressions on the change in bribes and 
favors (from round t-1 to round t) on punishment spending by the citizen in the previous round.  
To test for cross-cultural differences in responsiveness to punishment, we add variables for 
Pakistan (dummy variable equaling 1 if the subject is located in Pakistan) and interactions terms 
of culture with previous punishment behavior.  The results are presented in Table 5.   
[Table 5 here] 
This table shows that firm punishment in the previous round has a negative and 
significant impact on the change in bribing behavior across rounds, with firms less likely to offer 
a bribe as a response. Similarly, tokens spent punishing the official also yield changes in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 One exception to the difference in firm punishment is that Pakistani subjects punish firms approximately 1.5 
tokens more than US subjects when a bribe is offered, but not accepted by the official.  While we have little 
evidence of why this occurs, we conjecture that this may be due to differences in how subjects perceive the 
confiscation of the bribe.  US subjects may view the confiscation as punishment, while Pakistanis may not view that 
as punishment, and feel the need to further reprimand the firms. 
24 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
 
	  
15	  
behavior: official punishment in the previous round has a negative and significant impact on the 
change in favor provision, with officials less likely to provide favors.  Interestingly, tokens spent 
on firm punishment also lead to a change in favor provision, independent of official punishment; 
providing an indirect effect through reduced bribing.  Importantly, however, while higher 
spending on punishment significantly reduces the propensity to engage in bribes/favors in 
subsequent rounds, this propensity does not vary by culture.  That is, Pakistani firms/officials are 
no more or less sensitive to punishment than US firms/officials (as noted by the insignificant 
coefficients on the interaction terms in the table). Responsiveness to punishment does not vary 
by culture. Therefore, the main reason for the differential impact of punishment institutions 
across cultures (replicating findings from Banuri and Eckel, 2014) is that Pakistanis punish 
officials significantly less than in the US.  Punishment of officials yields a reduction in favors, 
and subsequently, a reduction in bribes.   
Overall, we find stark rebounds of both bribes and favors in the US and Pakistan, which 
indicates that subjects largely return to similar levels of bribery post-crackdown. This suggests 
that engaging in bribery (at least in the time horizon of our experiment) is determined largely by 
incentives, and that intrinsic motives (through cumulative moral costs) may play a role in 
reducing the likelihood of engaging in bribes, but these motives do not respond to crackdowns. 
We conclude that temporary policy interventions do not alter bribes in the long run.  Importantly, 
however, a temporary regime shift does not exacerbate the corruption problem.  This indicates 
that, while crackdowns may not have a lasting positive impact, they may not have detrimental 
impacts either.   
 
5. Conclusion  
 We address the question of how crackdowns on bribery might interact with social norms 
to exacerbate the corruption problem.  We implement corruption norms by drawing samples 
from two countries with very different societal levels of corruption. Our results indicate that 
bribery is largely affected by extrinsic incentives – direct financial consequences.  Crackdowns 
(i.e. punishment institutions) can be implemented in a way to shift incentives away from corrupt 
behavior, but need to be sustained in order to have a long-term impact.  Without enforcement, we 
find that bribery returns back to pre-crackdown levels.  Furthermore, the difference between pre- 
and post-crackdown behavior does not vary by culture, meaning that intrinsic motives have little 
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impact in a repeated game framework.  As a matter of policy, our results underline the need for 
sustainable policy tools to combat corruption.  Proponents of corruption crackdowns may argue 
that each intervention changes corruption norms in subtle ways, and that repeated crackdowns 
may eventually yield differences in overall corruption levels.  We find very little evidence of any 
impact of motives and norms. 
 One potential factor that our study cannot address is the effect crackdowns have on 
selection.  As a reviewer correctly points out, crackdowns may remove the outliers from the 
corrupt pool, leaving the relatively “cleaner” individuals, and thus a relatively “cleaner” system.  
These are testable ideas, but outside the scope of this paper.  These selection issues are 
interesting areas for future research. 
Overall, these results are good news for policy-makers. First, if these lab results extend to 
the field, they suggest that different anti-bribery policies can be tested in a field setting without 
worrying about lasting negative effects. They also suggest that repeated crackdowns are not 
likely to exacerbate the corruption problem.  However, the results underline the importance of 
sustainable institutions in reducing bribery.  A key feature of this study is that it identifies the 
effects of a temporary, unsustained policy, which (to our knowledge) has not been addressed in 
the literature.  
 Our results find that corruption norms may be purely incentive-driven, and not based on 
ingrained values. From a policy standpoint, this suggests that not only can we trial different 
policy mechanisms without lasting effects, but also that individuals are not intrinsically 
motivated to bribe, but rather respond to expectations and extrinsic factors.  This lends credence 
to the economist’s view of the importance of extrinsic motives in corruption settings.  In effect, 
this provides some good news in that corruption can be combated as long as institutional 
constraints are addressed.  
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 Fig. 1  Bribery game tree for the pre-crackdown and post-crackdown periods 
 
 
  
  
Fig. 2  Short and long run effects of punishment on bribes (top) and favors (bottom) across 
cultures 
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Fig. 3  Pre-crackdown and post-crackdown bribe and favor frequency for US and Pakistani 
subjects. Graphs compare behavior in pre-crackdown phase to the post-crackdown phase. 
	   	  
	  	  
 
Fig. 4 Cross cultural differences in tokens allocated to punishment.  Figures report differences 
between Pakistan and the US.  Punishment differences computed from models 1 and 3 in Table 
A2 in the online appendix.  
  
Fig. 5  Citizen expenditure (in tokens) on punishment over time during the crackdown phase	  
	  
Table 1  Sample descriptive statistics	  
    US Pakistan 
Variable N = 96 N = 123 
Demographics, % of sample 
  
 
Female 40% 27% 
 
Average Age, years 20.73 20.65 
 
Personal Finances (4 = Poor) 2.60 2.61 
 
Family Income (5 = Much Above Average) 2.69 3.00 
 
Religious Attendance, 1+ per week (>1 per week) 28% (9%) 44% (22%) 
 
Part Time Student 5% 0% 
 
Employed (Full or Part-time) 43% 13% 
Cohort, % of sample 
  
 
Freshmen 3% 0% 
 
Sophomore 2% 22% 
 
Junior 32% 15% 
 
Senior 28% 40% 
 
Graduate Student 28% 17% 
 
Not a Student 6% 5% 
Major, % of sample 
  
 
Business / Economics 25% 78% 
 
Sciences 70% 40% 
 
Arts / Other 10% 3% 
Other 
  
 
Born in Corrupt Country 21% 97% 
 
Future Corruption Expectations (5 = Optimistic) 2.36 2.02 
  Government Action against Corruption (5 = Ineffective) 3.31 4.30 
 
  
Table 2  Overall bribe and favor outcomes 
Bribe Frequency 
 
Pre-Crackdown Phase Crackdown Phase Post-Crackdown Phase 
US 
Frequency 72% 33% 63% 
Difference from Pre-Crackdown -- -39%*** -9% 
Pakistan 
Frequency 66% 54% 60% 
Difference from Pre-Crackdown -- -12% -6% 
Difference across Culture (US less PK) 6% -21%* 3% 
    Favor Frequency 
 
Pre-Crackdown Phase Crackdown Phase Post-Crackdown Phase 
US 
Frequency 54% 16% 52% 
Difference from Pre-Crackdown -- -38%*** -2% 
Pakistan 
Frequency 56% 44% 47% 
Difference from Pre-Crackdown -- -12% -9% 
Difference across Culture (US less PK) -2% -28%** 5% 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
a The percentages are calculated based on the number of bribes/favors provided in each country, 
divided by the total rounds where bribes and favors were possible. 
b Statistics tests between phases are one-sample 2-tailed proportions tests, and between the US 
and Pakistan are 2 sample, 2-tailed proportions tests.  Since this is a repeated game, treating each 
decision as independent is inappropriate.  Therefore, the proportions tests are conducted using 
each subject as a single observation, rather than each decision as a single observation. 
	   	  
Table 3  Regression results for bribe and favor activity in the US and Pakistan	   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Bribes Favors 
  US PK US PK 
Crackdown phase (D) -1.155*** -0.159 -1.494*** -0.227 
  (0.26) (0.23) (0.27) (0.23) 
Post-crackdown phase (D) -0.259 0.057 -0.259 -0.256 
  (0.27) (0.24) (0.26) (0.23) 
Round # -0.097*** -0.023 -0.113*** -0.014 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Round # -0.052 -0.055 -0.016 -0.042 
     X Crackdown phase (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
Round # -0.014 -0.049 0.028 -0.017 
     X Post-crackdown phase (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Female 0.254 -0.841** -0.809** -0.492 
  (0.40) (0.37) (0.39) (0.44) 
Age 0.074 -0.415*** -0.078 -0.335** 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.14) 
Constant -0.335 9.534*** 2.626 7.362** 
  (2.51) (2.58) (2.07) (2.92) 
Log likelihood -466.0 -583.1 -438.3 -607.0 
Chi2 165.69 48.88 169.64 33.14 
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations (Groups) 960 (32) 1230 (41) 960 (32) 1230 (41) 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
a Random effects Probit regression estimates. Table reports marginal effects with group-level 
clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
b    For models 1 and 2, the dependent variable takes on a value of 1 if the firm offered a bribe 
and 0 otherwise.  For models 3 and 4, the dependent variable takes on a value of 1 if the 
government official provided a favor, and 0 otherwise. Models 1 and 3 are for US subjects, while 
models 2 and 4 are for Pakistan. 
	  
	   	  
Table 4: Regression results for culture interactions with pooled data  
  (1) (2) 
  Bribes Favors 
Post-crackdown phase -0.270 -0.237 
  (0.28) (0.26) 
Pre-crackdown round # -0.107*** -0.119*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) 
Post-Crackdown round # -0.124*** -0.094*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) 
Interactions:     
      Pakistan * Pre-crackdown phase -0.783* -0.567 
  (0.41) (0.37) 
      Pakistan * Post-crackdown phase -0.451 -0.577 
  (0.41) (0.37) 
      Pakistan * Pre-crackdown * round 0.083** 0.107*** 
  (0.04) (0.04) 
      Pakistan * Post-crackdown * round 0.047 0.064 
  (0.04) (0.04) 
Female -0.544 -0.697** 
  (0.34) (0.32) 
Age -0.228** -0.208** 
  (0.11) (0.09) 
Constant 6.426*** 5.339*** 
  (2.26) (1.87) 
Log likelihood -667.4 -731.2 
Chi2 52.12 46.70 
P 0.000 0.000 
Observations (Groups) 1460 (73) 1460 (73) 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
a Random effects probit estimates. Table reports coefficients with group-level clustered standard 
errors in parentheses. 
b For model 1 the dependent variable takes on a value of 1 if the firm offered a bribe and 0 
otherwise.  For model 2, the dependent variable takes on a value of 1 if the government official 
provided a favor and 0 otherwise.  	    
Table 5  Regression results for changes in bribes and favors during the crackdown phase 
  (1) (2) 
  
Change in 
Bribes 
Change in 
Favors 
Round # 0.003 -0.004 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm punishment -0.019** -0.024*** 
     (previous round) (0.01) (0.01) 
Government official punishment -0.010 -0.054*** 
     (previous round) (0.01) (0.01) 
Pakistan 0.045 0.021 
  (0.05) (0.04) 
Interactions:     
      Pakistan * Firm punishment -0.017 0.007 
          (previous round) (0.01) (0.01) 
      Pakistan * Government official punishment 0.016 0.010 
          (previous round) (0.01) (0.01) 
Female 0.007 -0.058 
  (0.04) (0.04) 
Age 0.005 0.004 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant -0.130 0.015 
  (0.29) (0.21) 
Within R2 0.059 0.208 
Between R2 0.011 0.086 
Overall R2 0.046 0.159 
P 0.000 0.000 
Observations (Groups) 657 (73) 657 (73) 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
a Random effects OLS regressions. Table reports coefficients with group-level clustered standard 
errors in parentheses. 
b    Dependent variable for model 1 is the change in bribing from the previous round (t-1) to the 
current round (t). Hence the variable takes on a value of 0 if no change in behavior is observed; -
1 if subject bribed in the previous round but did not in this round; and +1 if subject did not bribe 
in the previous round but bribed in this round.  Dependent variable for model 2 is the change in 
favors from the previous round (t-1) to the current round (t). 
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Appendix 1:  Additional analysis. 
Table A1  Regression results for bribes and favors in the pre-crackdown phase 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Bribes Favors 
  US PK US PK 
Round # -0.196* 0.057 0.112 0.007 
  (0.12) (0.10) (0.13) (0.09) 
Favor (previous round) 0.553 0.243     
  (0.40) (0.33) 
 
  
Bribe (current round) 
  
3.210*** 1.586*** 
      (0.13) (0.33) 
History         
     Number of Successful Bribes 
(Cumulative) 0.005 -0.264 -0.503** -0.076 
  (0.24) (0.21) (0.22) (0.16) 
Log Likelihood -75.2 -100.1 -78.1 -117.0 
Chi2 14.46 2.32 69.21 26.04 
P 0.002 0.508 0.000 0.000 
Observations (Groups) 207 (23) 234 (26) 270 (27) 300 (30) 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
a Fixed effects logit regressions. Table reports coefficients with group-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
b For models 1 and 2, the dependent variable takes on a value of 1 if the firm offered a bribe and 0 otherwise.  For 
models 3 and 4, the dependent variable takes on a value of 1 if the government official provided a favor, and 0 
otherwise.  Models 1 and 3 are for US subjects, while models 2 and 4 are for Pakistan. 
c Due to no variation in the dependent variable (i.e. subject always/never offered a bribe/favor), 9 groups (90 
observations) were dropped from model 1, 15 (150 obs.) groups from model 2, 5 (50 obs.) groups from model 3, and 
11 (110 obs.) groups from model 4. 
 
	  
Table A2  Cross-cultural comparisons of punishment	  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Firm Punishment Government Official Punishment 
No bribe - No favor 0.424 1.385** 0.110 0.381 
  (0.32) (0.59) (0.28) (0.51) 
No bribe - Favor 2.150 2.801 11.820*** 11.860*** 
  (1.87) (1.94) (1.55) (1.56) 
Bribe - No favor 1.302** 1.055** 0.021 0.035 
  (0.51) (0.51) (0.42) (0.43) 
Bribe - Favor 3.212*** 3.235*** 5.292*** 5.351*** 
  (0.58) (0.63) (0.49) (0.50) 
Pakistan X No bribe - No favor -0.068 -0.124 0.287 0.333 
  (0.47) (0.46) (0.40) (0.40) 
Pakistan X No bribe - Favor -1.001 -1.389 -6.372*** -6.258*** 
  (2.00) (2.00) (1.65) (1.66) 
Pakistan X Bribe - No favor 1.500** 1.617** 0.040 0.199 
  (0.68) (0.66) (0.57) (0.56) 
Pakistan X Bribe - Favor -0.690 -0.848 -2.595*** -2.564*** 
  (0.66) (0.65) (0.56) (0.54) 
Alternate target punishment   -0.079*   -0.059*  
  
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.03) 
Round # 
 
-0.143*** 
 
-0.046 
    (0.04)   (0.03) 
Total bribes in pre-crackdown 
 
-0.109 
 
0.044 
  
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.09) 
Total favors in pre-crackdown 
 
0.134 
 
-0.051 
    (0.10)   (0.09) 
Overall R2 0.121 0.134 0.267 0.267 
Between R2 0.208 0.182 0.226 0.198 
Within R2 0.093 0.120 0.296 0.306 
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 730 730 730 730 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
a Random effects regressions. Group-level clustered Standard errors in parentheses. 
b All models are restricted to the crackdown phase. Model 1 and 2 use citizen expenditure on firm punishment as 
their dependent variable. Mode1 1 controls for bribe and favor behavior in the triad, while model 2 adds controls for 
punishment of government official, period, and history. Models 3 and 4 estimate the same specification (as in 
models 1 and 2) for citizen expenditure on government official punishment. 
c Models 2 and 4 use punishment of the alternative target as a control. This is because citizens have a combined 
fixed budget of 15 tokens for punishing both the firm and the official. 
 
 
Appendix 2: Alternative specification for Table 3 and related discussion. 
In the paper, table 3 estimates a random effects probit model for bribes and favors in all rounds.  
The round variable ranges from 1 to 10, such that the intercepts and slopes of each phase are 
directly tested against each other.  As an anonymous referee points out, an alternate specification 
is to replace the round variable with another which ranges from 1 to 30, to capture the entire 
trend of the experiment (similar to structural break analysis).  This approach tests for structural 
breaks, under the assumption of a consistent trend across phases.  In this appendix, we estimate 
the model similar to table 3 in the paper, but with the round variable specified as above.  This 
allows us to estimate the change in probability from the end of each round to the beginning of the 
subsequent round.1 
Table A3 below estimates a random effects probit model of the probability of offering a 
bribe in the US and in Pakistan (models 1 and 2 in the table). We regress the dummy variable for 
offering a bribe (equal to 1 if a bribe was offered) on dummy variables for the crackdown and 
post-crackdown phases.  We use the round number (from 1-30) to account for any trend, as well 
as interactions between the phases and the round number.  Finally, we control for basic 
demographic characteristics (gender and age). 
 Taking the US data first, we observe what appears to be a significant negative trend over 
the course of the experiment, with each successive round reducing the likelihood of a bribe 
(p<0.01).  This trend does not vary by phase, with both the punishment phase and post-
punishment phase yielding further insignificant reductions in the probability of offering a bribe 
(p=0.23 and p=0.74 for the crackdown and post-crackdown phases respectively).  For Pakistan, 
we also observe a negative trend in bribes, but it is insignificant (p=0.39), as are the interactions 
between phases and the trend (p=0.14 and p=0.20).  The crackdown phase does not have an 
independent effect at the outset, as we do not observe a significant shift in bribes immediately 
after the crackdown phase is imposed either in the US (p=0.51), or in Pakistan (p=0.16).  Once 
the crackdown phase ends, however, we observe a significant increase in bribes immediately 
afterwards, both in the US (p<0.05) and in Pakistan (p<0.05).   
Favors follow a similar pattern, due to the strong relationship between bribes and favors.  
In the US, we observe a negative and significant coefficient on the round variable (p<0.01), 
which does not significantly differ by phase.  In addition, we see no significant change at the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Note that most of the coefficients in table A3 are identical to those in table 3.  This is simply because there is one 
very minor difference between the two tables: the coding of the period variable (ranging from 1 to 10 for table 3, 
and from 1 to 30 for table A3).  This change impacts the intercepts of the crackdown and post-crackdown phase, but 
leaves the other estimates unchanged.  This is because the re-specification changes the interpretation of the 
intercepts from direct comparisons with the intercept of the pre-crackdown phase (table 3) to comparisons with the 
trend (i.e. structural breaks: table A3). 
onset of the crackdown phase (p=0.73), but a significant increase in the probability of granting a 
favor once the crackdown is removed (p<0.1).  By contrast, in Pakistan the probability of 
providing a favor does not change over time (p=0.59).  In addition, the probability of providing a 
favor does not significantly increase at the onset of either the Crackdown, or Post-crackdown 
phases in Pakistan (p=0.45 and p=0.60 respectively). Thus, it is apparent that in the US, bribes 
and favors decline over time, but a sharp increase is observed at the beginning of the post-
crackdown phase.  In Pakistan, we find little evidence of a decline, and also no evidence of a 
rebound. 
 
Table A3  Regression results for bribe and favor activity in the US and Pakistan – Alternate 
specification	   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Bribes Favors 
  US PK US PK 
Crackdown Phase (D) 0.332 0.626 -0.197 0.335 
  (0.50) (0.44) (0.57) (0.44) 
Post-Crackdown Phase (D) 1.960** 1.509** 1.453* 0.368 
  (0.79) (0.72) (0.78) (0.69) 
Round # -0.097*** -0.023 -0.113*** -0.014 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Round # -0.052 -0.055 -0.016 -0.042 
     X Crackdown Phase (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
Round # -0.014 -0.049 0.028 -0.017 
     X Post-Crackdown Phase (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Female 0.254 -0.841** -0.809** -0.492 
  (0.40) (0.37) (0.39) (0.44) 
Age 0.074 -0.415*** -0.078 -0.335** 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.14) 
Constant -0.335 9.534*** 2.626 7.362** 
  (2.51) (2.58) (2.07) (2.92) 
Log Likelihood -466.0 -583.1 -438.3 -607.0 
Chi2 165.69 48.88 169.64 33.14 
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations (Groups) 960 (32) 1230 (41) 960 (32) 1230 (41) 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
a Random effects probit regression estimates. Table reports marginal effects with group-level clustered standard 
errors in parentheses. 
b For models 1 and 2, the dependent variable takes on a value of 1 if the firm offered a bribe and 0 otherwise.  For 
models 3 and 4, the dependent variable takes on a value of 1 if the government official provided a favor, and 0 
otherwise. Models 1 and 3 are for US subjects, while models 2 and 4 are for Pakistan. 
  
Declining Bribes and Favors? 
In order to understand the strong apparent decline in bribes and favors over time in the 
US data, the apparent ineffectiveness of the crackdown phase, and the large increase in 
corruption following the crackdown, we compare behavior in the Post-crackdown phase with 
behavior in a related study (Banuri and Eckel 2014), where there is no crackdown phase.  In the 
related study, we conduct sessions consisting of 20 consecutive periods of play without citizen 
punishment (called “No-Punishment”).  These sessions utilize the same game as in the pre-
crackdown and post-crackdown phases of the current study.  The only difference between No-
Punishment and the current experiment is that the current experiment has 10 rounds where 
citizens can punish their partners (Crackdown) sandwiched between 20 rounds where citizens are 
passive (Pre- and Post-crackdown), while No-Punishment features 20 rounds where citizens are 
passive.  The lack of a Crackdown phase eliminates the possibility of a norm signal, or 
motivation crowding as a direct result of the Crackdown.  The key comparison, then, is between 
rounds 11-20 of No-Punishment (from Banuri and Eckel 2014) with the Post-crackdown phase 
of the current experiment.2  
Figure A1 shows bribes and favors in the final 10 rounds of both experiments.  In the first 
10 rounds of the experiments (not graphed), behavior is virtually identical:  Subjects offered 
bribes in 72% of all rounds in the current experiment, and 63% in the No-Punishment experiment 
(p=0.51).  Similarly, subjects provided favors in 54% of all rounds in the crackdown experiment, 
and 56% in the No-Punishment experiment (p=0.93).  Thus for the first ten rounds in the two 
experiments, the nearly identical protocols produced statically indistinguishable behavior.  
In the final ten rounds (graphed), behavior in the post-crackdown phase and in the No-
Punishment experiment are nearly identical.3  As we can observe from the figures, there is no 
significant difference in behavior during the final 10 rounds, either in the US, or in Pakistan.  In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 We recruited 183 graduates at the same institutions in the US and Pakistan to participate in the experiments.  Note 
that the treatments are not directly comparable as the data was collected at different times (in February and March 
2009; a year earlier).  In addition, the parameters and exchange rates were identical in the two years, so the main 
difference is that subjects in the No Punishment treatment experienced 10 fewer rounds of game play.  Any 
differences due to the (relatively minor) changes in protocol are possible and make direct comparisons difficult. 
3 The No-Punishment experiment protocol informs subjects that they will participate in 20 rounds with fixed 
partners, while the crackdown protocol informs subjects that they will participate in 30 rounds with fixed partners. 
the US, subjects bribed in 63% percent of the final ten rounds in the crackdown experiment, 
compared to 58% in the No-Punishment data (p=0.77).  Similarly, US subjects provided favors 
in 52% of the final ten rounds in the crackdown data, compared to 48% in the No-Punishment 
data (p=0.81).  Differences across these data are not significant in Pakistan either: subjects 
offered bribes in 60% of the final ten rounds in the crackdown data, which is not significantly 
different from 61% of rounds in the No-Punishment data (p=0.94).  Favors were provided at 47% 
and 60% in the crackdown and No-Punishment data respectively, yielding no significant 
differences (p=0.38).   We find no significant differences in bribe and favor behavior in the post-
crackdown phase when compared with behavior in an experiment where the crackdown does not 
occur. This comparison challenges the interpretation of the post-crackdown change in behavior 
as an increase in corruption: It implies that behavior is simply returning to pre-crackdown levels 
of corruption.   
 
 
Fig. A1  Impact of crackdown in the final 10 rounds.  Graphs compare behavior in the final 10 
rounds of the “No Punishment” experiment (where the crackdown phase never occurred) to the 
final 10 rounds of the crackdown experiment, directly following the crackdown phase (“Post 
crackdown phase”).
Appendix 3:  Game Instructions and Screenshots 
Pakistan instruction screenshots: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Task 2 Instructions Supplement: 
 
Stage 1: Firm's decision  
First, the firm decides whether he/she wants to send a private payment to the government official.  
If the firm offers a private payment, then the credit of the firm is reduced by 10 tokens. This amount is 
transferred to the government official.   
If the firm does not offer a private payment, then the tokens remain unchanged. 
 
Stage 2: Government official's decision  
The government official decides on whether to provide a private benefit to the firm (at a cost of 2 tokens).  
If the government official provides a private benefit:  
• Firm receives 30 additional tokens,  
• Government official pays 2 tokens, 
• Citizen loses 35 tokens.  
If the government official does not provide a private benefit:  
• Firm receives 0 tokens,  
• Government official forfeits the 10 tokens paid by the firm if the firm made a private payment, and 
receives 0 otherwise. Note that the firm does not get the 10 tokens back.  
• Citizen receives 0 additional tokens.  
 
Stage 3: Citizen’s decision 
Now the citizen decides whether or not to reduce the payoffs of the firm and/or the government official. The 
citizen can choose to pay an amount, and then the payoffs of the firm or government official or both, are 
reduced by 2 times the amount spent. 
If the citizen chooses not to reduce the payoffs: 
• Firm receives 0 tokens, 
• Government official receives 0 tokens, 
• Citizen receives 0 tokens. 
If the citizen chooses to reduce the payoffs: 
• Firm loses 2 times the amount of tokens spent by the citizen on reducing the firm’s payoffs,  
• Government official loses 2 times the amount of tokens spent by the citizen on reducing the official’s 
payoffs, 
• Citizen chooses how much he/she spends to reduce payoffs, the citizen can pay between 1 and 15 
tokens for either the firm or the official or both. 
 
For example, if the citizen chooses to spend 5 tokens on reducing the firm’s amount and 4 tokens on reducing 
the government official’s amount, then the citizen’s credit is reduced by 9 tokens (5+4), the firm’s credit is 
reduced by 10 tokens (5*2), and the government official’s credit is reduced by 8 tokens (4*2). 
 
 
Please record your total earnings for Task 2 below: 
Total Tokens Earned in Task 2: _____________________________ 
	  
	  
